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We estimate an equilibrium model of grading policies where professors set grading policies
and students register and study for classes, in part, based on these policies. Professors value
enrollment, learning, and student study time, and set policies taking into account how other
professors grade. Male and female students value course types, the benefits associated with
higher grades, and effort costs differently. We calculate how much of the differences in grading
policies across fields is driven by differences in demand for courses in those fields and how much
is due to differences in professor preferences across fields. We also decompose differences in
female/male course taking across fields driven by differences in i) cognitive skills, ii) valuation
of grades, iii) cost of studying, and iv) field preferences. We then run counterfactual simulations
to evalaute changes to grading policies. Restrictions on grading policies that equalize grade
distributions across classes result in higher (lower) grades in science (non-science) fields but
more (less) work being required. As women are willing to study more than men, this restriction
on grading policies results in more women pursuing the sciences and more men pursuing the
non-sciences.
1 Introduction
Even after accounting for selection, substantial earnings differences exist across majors. Majors in
engineering and the sciences, as well as economics and business, pay substantially more than other
∗Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not quote without permission. The views expressed in this article are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Trade Commission.
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fields.1 Further, earnings disparities across majors have increased substantially over time (Altonji
et al. (2014) and Gemici & Wiswall (2014)). Despite their value in the marketplace, STEM (Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields are perceived to be under-subscribed. A report by
the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2012) highlighted difficulties in the
U.S. retaining “its historical preeminence in science and technology” due to a potential shortage of
approximately 1 million STEM professionals over a decade. Florida has proposed freezing tuition
for STEM majors (Alvarez (2012)), and the state of New York is offering free tuition for high
performing students who enroll in public institutions as STEM majors, conditional on working in
the state for at least five years (Chapman (2014)).
Despite the interest in increasing STEM participation, existing literature shows many more
students enroll in college expecting to major in a STEM field than actually finish in a STEM field.2
This is not just due to students dropping out: many students switch from STEM to non-STEM
fields, particularly in comparison to those who switch from non-STEM to STEM fields. Further,
it is predictable who will switch. Those who have relatively weak academic preparation (e.g. SAT
scores or HS grades) are much more likely to leave STEM fields. While relatively high levels of
academic preparation are associated with persisting in STEM majors, there is little evidence that
high levels of academic preparation are more rewarded in the labor market for STEM majors than
for non-STEM majors. Women are also more likely to switch out of STEM and existing literature
generally finds that this differential attrition cannot be explained by differences in preparation.3
One underexplored channel for influencing the number and composition of STEM majors is
grading policies. Should grading policies prove to be an important predictor of major choice,
they may serve as a fast and effective way of increasing STEM majors. While other means such as
increasing pre-college academic preparation or the share of underrepresented groups in STEM fields
may also be effective, they are also very costly with the benefits coming much later. Shifting the way
teachers teach the sciences and introducing more laboratory-based curricula are both expensive.
Altering training, hiring, and promotion in academia, government agencies, and firms is also costly,
1See Altonji et al. (2012), Altonji et al. (2016),Xue & Larson (2015) and Altonji et al. (forthcoming) for reviews.
2See Arcidiacono (2004), Arcidiacono et al. (forthcoming), Astorne-Figari & Speer (2019, 2018), Fischer (2017),
Griffith (2010), Kugler et al. (2017), Ost (2010), Price (2010), Rask (2010), and Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2014)
for studies related to STEM attrition.
3See Arcidiacono et al. (2012), Astorne-Figari & Speer (2019, 2018), Kugler et al. (2017), Ost (2010), and Price
(2010). Griffith (2010) is a notable exception which finds that differences in preparation can explain a large portion
of the gender difference in STEM attrition.
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as are adjusting long-standing cultural attitudes in the home, school, and workplace. Grading
policy changes can be implemented immediately and locally.
There is evidence that grades affect sorting into majors. The same majors that pay well also
give (on average) significantly lower grades (Sabot & Wakeman-Linn (1991), Johnson (2003)) and
are associated with more study time (Brint et al. (2012), Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2014)).
Lower grades and higher study times deter enrollment. Sabot & Wakeman-Linn (1991) show
that the absolute level of grades was a far more important indicator of taking further courses in
the subject than their ranking within the class. Butcher et al. (2014) showed that a policy of
capping the fraction of A’s given at Wellesley College resulted in shifts towards science classes
and science majors. Minaya (2018) shows that a policy change which reduced the differential in
average grades between STEM and non-STEM fields led to an increase in STEM participation.
There is also evidence that students enter unaware of the extent of cross-department differences in
grading standards. Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2014) show that the over-optimism regarding
performance at Berea College is primarily driven by students over-predicting their performance in
the sciences. As students take more classes, they generally revise their expected performance in
the sciences downward. This holds true even for students who persist in the sciences who ought to
have received relatively positive grade realizations.4
With students responding to grading practices through their choice of courses, departments
may set their grading policies in order to deter or encourage enrollment as well as shape the ability
distribution of students. Those with low enrollments may find it difficult to increase or maintain
their faculty size. Hence, incentives exist to raise grades in order to encourage enrollment in these
departments. On the other hand, departments that are flush with students may have incentives to
lower grades to keep their enrollments to a more manageable size. Within any given department,
individual professors may also seek to influence enrollment up or down for his or her class to
minimize teaching effort or maximize student learning.5
Differences in grading policies may have differing effects for males and females. In principle
female students should be particularly interested in STEM fields.6 Women report studying sub-
stantially more than men (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2014), Arcidiacono et al. (2012), Graetz
4See also Wiswall & Zafar (2015).
5This issue is becoming even more salient as more universities move toward a fiscal model where departmental
budgets are more directly determined by enrollment size or credits generated.
6The closing of the gender gap in college matriculation and labor market wage is due, in significant part, to
increased emphasis in math and science curricula for women. See Goldin et al. (2006) and Goldin (2014).
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& Karimi (2019)), and they should be undeterred by the higher study requirements of these classes.
Yet, females are substantially less likely to graduate with a STEM major than males.7 Women
comprise roughly half of U.S. college graduates and the workforce, yet only account for 30 percent
of STEM degree holders and one-quarter of STEM jobs Women in STEM: 2017 Update (ESA Issue
Brief #06-17) (2017). Theories for why this might happen have been numerous, including gender
differences in competitiveness (Astorne-Figari & Speer 2019, Buser et al. 2014, Fischer 2017, Ellison
& Swanson 2019), gender composition of faculty and students (Carrell et al. 2010, Griffith 2010,
Hoffmann & Oreopoulos 2009, Kugler et al. 2017, Rask & Bailey 2002, Hazari et al. 2013, Bostwick
& Weinberg 2018), initial preparation (Griffith 2010, Rask 2010, Card & Payne 2017, Joensen &
Nielsen 2016), future labor market considerations (Bronson 2014, Gemici & Wiswall 2014, Zafar
2013, Jiang 2019, Turner & Bowen 1999), and gender differences in preferences for grades (Kugler
et al. 2017, Minaya 2018, Rask & Bailey 2002, Rask & Tiefenthaler 2008).8 Good grades may yield
direct psychic benefit, or they may impact time to graduation or ability to qualify for grants and
scholarships. For example, if female students are more risk averse or pessimistic about attrition
probability compared to their male counterparts, or believe that gender discrimination (especially
in STEM fields) leads to a comparative disadvantage, grades may hold more value. Again, the
advantage to focusing on grading policies is that it may be relatively cheap to do so compared to
alternative programs.
We propose to estimate an equilibrium model of student course enrollment and effort decisions as
well as professor decisions regarding grading standards. How professors set grades affects enrollment
and how much students study, though differentially for men and women. The professor objective
function includes enrollments, so part of how professors set grades is determined by course demand.
With the estimates of the equilibrium model, we will be able to evaluate how differences in grading
practices across fields affect, partly as a result of demand, the share of courses taken in different
fields. Further, we can see whether cross-departmental differences in professor preferences over
enrollment either exacerbate or mitigate the differences in grading across fields.
7The gender gap is not uniform across STEM fields. Indeed, in some STEM fields, such as biosciences, women
receiving BAs actually outnumber men.
8Bar & Ross (2018) is one contrary example showing that women are no more sensitive to lower grades than men.
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2 Data
Estimating such a model requires rich data on student course taking, study hours, and grades. We
use a detailed student enrollment data set from the University of Kentucky (UK). UK, the state’s
flagship public post-secondary institution, has a current undergraduate enrollment of approximately
21,000. The school was ranked 119 out of approximately 200 ‘National Universities’ by U.S. News &
World Report (U.S. News & World Report 2013). This places UK in the middle of the distribution
of large post-secondary institutions, and the student body serves as a good cross-section of college
students nationwide.
The data set contains student demographic and course enrollment information. Each semester,
the entire student body’s course selections and grades are recorded by the Registrar’s Office. This
data set is particularly valuable because every student outcome in every class is captured, allowing
us to estimate a rich model of student and professor interactions. Furthermore, we can analyze
course selection and performance explicitly modeling the student choosing his or her semester
course-load (which may be contain one to five courses) from the entire course catalog. We also
collect information on course pre-requisites. Restricting the student’s choice set using this data
aids computation as well as creating a more true-to-life representation of the decisions a student
faces when selecting his or her courses. For this study, we focus on student enrollment observations
from one semester, Fall 2012.9
In addition, we have access to class evaluation surveys completed by students at the end of the
semester. We note that coverage is not complete, as some departments chose not to make evaluation
data available. Linking the class evaluation data to the enrollment data is complex, as rules for
identifying the course (or sections within the course) and instructor (or sub-instructor - frequently
a graduate student - teaching under the supervision of a head-instructor) are defined independently
by the department. As students do not identify themselves in the evaluation forms, we aggregate
the data up to the class level. We are able to match 76 percent of classes successfully. We then
restrict the data to classes with at least a 50 percent response rate and drop classes with small
numbers of respondents to prevent possible identification. Most critically for our research, students
are asked about the number of hours per week they spend on studying for this particular course.
This information makes the identification of structural parameters on study effort possible, allowing
9We have the capability to link student data across multiple semesters, spanning Fall 2008 to Spring 2013. This
yields approximately 1.4 million student/class observations. We restrict ourselves to one semester due to computa-
tional constraints.
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us to analyze how differences in average study time relates to course and student characteristics
across courses.10
Our Fall 2012 selected sample yields approximately 58,000 student/class observations. There are
about 16,000 unique undergraduates, implying that on average, each student enrolls and completes
four courses.11 Table 1 provides demographic summary statistics, separated by gender. Overall,
women and men look similar when entering college. Women have slightly higher high school grades
and slightly lower standardized ACT scores.12 Women also have higher grades while in college.
Sharp differences show up in major selection. While women comprise a slight majority at UK
overall, the ratio between men and women in STEMmajors is approximately 1.6. This ratio remains
nearly identical regardless of whether we include or exclude Economics, Finance, Accounting, and
Data Sciences from the definition of STEM major. In this study, we categorize Economics, Finance,
Accounting, and Data Sciences as part of STEM. Analysis excluding these four departments yield
qualitatively similar results. In contrast to students from more selective institutions (seen in many
other studies of higher education outcomes), over 30 percent of students at UK are part-time
students, taking less than 12 credits during the semester.
Table 2 summarizes class-level characteristics separated by STEM-status of the course. In the
first column, we use the more restrictive definition of STEM. In the second column, we show class-
level characteristics for Economics, Finance, Accounting, and Data Sciences, showing that they
closely mirror those of STEM classes. In the third column, we combine the classes from the first
two columns. From hereon, STEM classes refers to this more inclusive definition. Class-level STEM
classes are substantially larger and give significantly lower grades compared to non-STEM courses.13
As implied by Table 1, female students are the minority in STEM classes. This is despite the fact
that they perform better, on average, than their male counterparts in these courses. On average,
students spend on additional forty-five minutes per week (or 40 percent more time) studying in
a representative STEM course, compared to time spent on studying for an average non-STEM
10The survey asks 20 questions on the value of the course and instructor to the student on a five-point Likert scale.
Each student reveals what year of school he or she is in, how valuable he or she finds the course and instructor,
expected final grade, and whether the course was a major requirement.
11We also observe withdrawal data. Withdrawal rate of undergraduates is approximately 5.4%. Of these, approxi-
mately 45 % withdraw from the course prior to the midterm examination. We speculate that many of these students
were ‘shopping around’ for courses at the start of the semester and realized that they needed to drop a course they
had not been attending part-way through the semester.
12SAT scores are converted to equivalent ACT scores.
13See Table A.11 for categorization of departments into STEM / non-STEM.
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course. The study time difference actually understates the true gap across STEM and non-STEM
courses. Students with higher academic ability will select more often into STEM courses, so each
hour spent studying should yield more learning. Yet, STEM classes average much lower grades.
A student attempting to generate an equivalent grade across a STEM and non-STEM course will
have to invest significantly more than an extra 40 percent in study time in the STEM course.
Table 3 presents simple OLS results showing the relationship between individual and class char-
acteristics with grades and study hours after controlling for a large number of academic background
measures.14 The grades regression sample is at the student/class level, and the study hours per
week regression sample is at the class level. The first column gives the results for grades. The
patterns are consistent with those in Table 2, STEM classes give lower grades and females have
higher grades. Classes that have a higher fraction of female students also give higher grades. This
is consistent with there not being a grade curve that is common across STEM or non-STEM de-
partments else the higher grades females receive would translate into lower grades for everyone else.
Class size has a negative effect on grades. The coefficient on class size confounds two effects that
work in opposite directions. On the one hand, students prefer higher grades so higher enrollments
should be associated with higher grades. On the other, courses that have high intrinsic demand
may have lower grades since these courses do not need to have high grades to attract students.
The second column on Table 3 shows regressions of study hours on the average characteristics
of the class. STEM classes are associated with an extra half hour of study, slightly less than what
is seen in the descriptive statistics. This suggests that STEM classes are attracting students who
are willing to study more, with the grading policies in the STEM classes further spurring on these
students to commit more time to study. Classes that have more women also study more, consis-
tent with the previous literature (DiPrete & Buchmann 2013). But perhaps the most interesting
coefficient is that on average grades. Courses that give higher grades have less study time, suggest-
ing grades should be interpreted as relative, not absolute, measures of accomplishment, as well as
suggesting grade inflation may have negative consequences for learning.
14We restrict our sample to standard classes with at least 16 students. The total number of classes in the data
set is 2,026. From this we exclude nearly half of the classes from the analysis. Many of the excluded classes can be
categorized into: non-academic classes (e.g. “academic orientation” or “ undergraduate advising”), advanced and
remedial independent student courses (including tutoring), classes in fine arts requiring individualized instruction
(e.g. “voice”, “jazz ensemble”, or “art studio”), and graduate-level classes taken by very advanced undergraduate
students.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Gender
Men Women
High school GPA 3.49 3.62
(0.472) (0.401)
ACT Reading Score 26.1 26.0
(5.13) (4.84)
ACT Math Score 25.7 23.9
(4.65) (4.23)
Fall 2012 GPA 2.86 3.12
(0.938) (0.848)
Fall 2012 Credits 11.5 11.7
(3.97) (3.85)
STEM Major 38.3% 24.6%
STEM & Econ Major 59.2% 37.6%
Black 6.86% 7.93%
Hispanic 2.48% 2.80%
Misc. Min. 2.10% 2.86%
1st Gen 13.5% 15.0%
Pell Grant 28.8% 30.2%
Note: Fall 2012 University of Kentucky undergraduate students, 7,904 men, 8,286 women. Econ
major include Economics, Finance, Accounting, and Data Sciences. Standard deviations in
parentheses.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Course Type
STEM + Econ = STEM & Econ Non-STEM
Class Size 80.4 79.2 80.2 41.4
(94.8) (119.1) (99.3) (46.0)
Average Grade 2.93 2.97 2.94 3.27
(0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.42)
Average Grade | Female 3.00 3.04 3.00 3.37
(0.56) (0.55) (0.55) (0.43)
Study Hours 2.61 2.34 2.56 1.82
(1.50) (1.23) (1.46) (0.85)
Percent Female 37.6% 34.1% 37.0% 58.3%
Percent Fem. Prof. 24.2% 40.0% 27.0% 46.4%
Note: Fall 2012 University of Kentucky courses with enrollments of 16 or more students, 281
STEM and 60 Economics courses, 743 non-STEM courses. For study hours, 239 STEM and 58
Economics courses and 584 non-STEM courses. Standard deviations in parentheses.
3 Model
Individual i chooses n courses from the set [1, . . . , J ]. Let dij = 1 if j is one of the n courses chosen
by student i and zero otherwise. The payoff associated with a bundle of courses is given by the
sum of the payoffs for each of the individual courses where the payoffs do not depend on the other
courses in the bundle. We specify the payoff for a particular course j as depending on student
i’s preference for the course, δij , the amount of study effort the individual chooses to exert in the
course, sij , and the expected grade conditional on study effort, E [gij | sij ]:
Uij = ϕiE [gij | sij ]− ψisij + δij (1)









dij = n, dij ∈ {0, 1}∀j
The grade student i receives in course j, gij , depends on the academic preparation of student
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Table 3: Regressions of Grades and Study Time on Characteristics of the Individual and/or Class
Study hours









ln(Class Size) -0.057 -0.299
(0.004) (0.057)
Observations 58,081 881
Note: STEM indicates a class offered in the STEM and Economics departments. Additional
controls for grades regression include, minority status, freshman, STEM major, pell grant,
in-state student, ACT score, HS GPA, percent minority, percent freshman.
Additional controls in study hours regression include percent freshmen, percent STEM major,
percent Pell grant, percent in-state, average ACT score, average HS GPA, percent minority.
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i for course j, Aij , the amount of study effort put forth by the student in the course, sij , the
grading policies of the professor, and a shock that is unknown to the individual at the time of
course enrollment, ηij . We specify the grading process as:
gij = βj + γj (Aij + ln(sij)) + ηij (3)
Grading policies by the professors are then choices over an intercept, βj , and a return to academic
preparation and effort, γj .
15 Gains from study effort enters in as a log to capture the diminishing
returns to studying. Along with the linear study effort cost defined in the utility function, this
ensures an interior solution for the optimal amount of study time.
Students are assumed to know the professors’ grading policies.16 Substituting in for expected
grades in (1) yields:
Uij = ϕi (βj + γj [Aij + ln(sij)])− ψisij + δij (4)









Substituting the optimal choice of study time into (4) yields:
Uij = ϕi (βj + γj [Aij + ln(ϕi) + ln(γj)− ln(ψi)− 1]) + δij (6)
Those who have lower study costs, low ψi, and higher levels of academic preparation, high Aij , find
courses with higher γjs relatively more attractive all else equal. Those who place a relatively high
weight on expected grades, high ϕi, study more conditional on choosing the same course, but are
more attracted to courses with higher grade intercepts, high βj .
Substituting the expression for optimal study time into the grade process equation yields:
gij = βj + γj (Aij + ln(ϕi) + ln(γj)− ln(ψi)) + ηij (7)
15For example, if there is a field-wide (or department-level) mandated/recommended grade distribution, we will be
able to capture such a policy, as βj and γj will have lower variance with-in vs. across department or field.
16Students have a number of formal and informal resources to learn about grading policies. Informally, they may
rely on friends who have previously taken the course and other information social networks. Professors may send out
preemptive signals by posting syllabi online. More formally, course evaluations, which also reveal the (anonymous)
responders’ own expected final course grades, are on-line and publicly available. In addition, several websites curate
online “reviews” of professors and courses.
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Professors who set relatively higher values of γj see more study effort because higher γjs induce
more effort and because higher γjs attract students with lower study costs.
The key equations for estimation are then given by:
(i) the solution to the students maximization problem where (6) is substituted into (2),
(ii) the grade production process given in (7), and
(iii) the optimal study effort given in (5).
The next section describes the parameterizations used to estimate the model as well as the assump-
tions necessary to overcome the fact that our measures of study effort from the course evaluations
are not linked to the individual’s characteristics.
4 Estimation
We first describe our estimating strategy under the assumption that there is no student-level unob-
served heterogeneity. Under this assumption, the log likelihood function is additively separable, and
we are able to estimate the parameters in three stages. We then show how to adapt our estimation
method to handle student-level unobserved heterogeneity.
In the first stage, we estimate a reduced form version of the grade production process (Eq. (7)).
The relationship between student characteristics and grades gives estimates for the reduced form
parameters. The returns to effort are also identified, up to a normalization at the department level,
by how student characteristics translate into grades relative to the normalized course.17
In the second stage, we relate the optimal study effort given in Eq. (5) to the student evaluation
data. The evaluations are collected for each class, and students report how many hours they spent
studying in that class. This helps us recover some of the study effort parameters, as well as unravel
some of the normalizations on the γs required in the first stage. We are able to relate all γs across
departments, but still can only identify the γs relative to one course.
In the last stage, we estimate the choice problem given by Eqs. (6) and (2). We use the
estimates from the first stage to calculate expected grades for each student and the estimated effort
from the second stage. Combining the estimates from these three stages allows us to identify all
17Technically, we mean groupings of departments. See Table A.12 for a list of departments in each of the aggregate
groupings. From hereon, we refer to these groupings as departments.
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the grading policy parameters, the grade preference parameters, the effort cost parameters, and
the course preference parameters.
4.1 Parameterizations
To estimate the model, we need to place some structure on course preferences, δij , the value of
grades, ψi, and the cost of effort, ϕi. Further, we must relate academic preparation, Aij , to what
we see in the data. Denote wi = 1 if individual i is female and zero otherwise. Denote Xi as a row
vector of explanatory variables such as ACT scores, high school grades, race, etc.18 Denote Zi as
a row vector of explanatory variables that affect preferences for particular departments or levels of
courses within departments. Hence Zi includes gender as well as year in school, allowing women to
have a preference for classes in particular departments and the attraction of upper-division versus
lower-division classes to vary by department and year in school. Preference shocks for courses are
represented by ϵij . Finally, we partition courses into K departments, K < J , where k(j) gives the
department for the jth course. We then parameterize the model as follows:
Aij = wiα1k(j) +Xiα2k(j) (8)
δij = δ0j + wiδ1k(j) + Ziδ2k(j) + ϵij (9)
ψi = exp (ψ0 + wiψ1 +Xiψ2) (10)
ϕi = ϕ0 + wiϕ1 (11)
There is no intercept in Aij as it can not be identified separately from the βjs. Note that the
same variables enter into academic preparation, preferences, and effort costs, only with different
coefficients. Preferences for courses allow for both course fixed effects as well as students with
particular characteristics preferring courses in particular departments, δ1k(j). Note also that the
effort costs are exponential in the explanatory variables. This ensures that effort costs are positive.
Finally, preferences for grades are only allowed to vary by gender. In principle, we could allow
them to vary with Xi as well, but this would substantially complicate the model.
Having separate estimates by gender across all the relevant parameters will help uncover some
of the driving forces behind the gender gap in STEM. For example, if female intrinsic demand for
courses in STEM departments is relatively low (δ1k(j) negative) while preferences for grades and
cost of effort are relatively equal across males and females (ψ1 and ϕ1 close to zero), then changing
grading policies will have no effect on the gender gap in STEM. In this case, it would require figuring
18The majority of students at the University of Kentucky submit ACT scores in their college applications.
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out why females are not interested in STEM fields, and policies would have to be geared more
towards early education about opportunities in STEM for females, or changing cultural attitudes
towards females in STEM. On the other hand, if females have significantly different preferences
over grades and study effort than males, then altering grading policies could affect the gender
distributions within classes and departments. For example, if females have higher preferences for
grades (ϕ1 positive) and lower cost of effort (ψ1 negative) than males, then increasing γj and
correspondingly changing β to keep enrollments in STEM courses the same would result in an
increase in the fraction of females in STEM.
4.2 Estimation without Unobserved Heterogeneity
4.2.1 Grade parameters
Substituting the parameterizations for academic preparation, Ai, the value of grades, ϕi, and study
costs, ψi, into (7) yields the following reduced form grade equation:






θ0j = βj + γj(ln(ϕ0) + ln(γj)− ψ0) (13)
θ1k(j) = α1k(j) + ln(ϕ0 + ϕ1)− ln(ϕ0)− ψ1 (14)
θ2k(j) = α2k(j) − ψ2 (15)
We estimate the reduced form parameters {θ0j , θ1, θ2} as well as the structural slopes, the γjs, using
nonlinear least squares. A normalization must be made for every department as scaling up the θs
by some factor and scaling down the γs by the same factor would be observationally equivalent.
We set one γj equal to one for each department.
19 Denote Ck as the normalization for department





θN1k(j) = θ1k(j)Ck(j) and θ
N
2k(j) = θ2k(j)Ck(j).
The variation in the data used to identify {θN1 , θN2 } comes from the relationship between student
characteristics and grades in each department. The variation in the data used to identify the γNj s
is how these characteristics translate into grades relative to the normalized courses.
19The study effort analysis allows us to recover the normalizations for all the departments but one, as we will show
in section 4.2.2. The final normalization is undone in the estimation of the utility parameters, shown in section 4.2.3.
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4.2.2 Study parameters
We next turn to recovering some of the study effort parameters as well as undoing the normalization
made on all the γs but one. To do so, we use (5). The issue with using (5) is that we do not directly
observe study effort. However, the course evaluation data give reported study hours for each
individual in the classroom. This information cannot be linked to the individual data on grades,
academic preparation, and course choices. But the evaluation data does provide information about
the year in school of the evaluator (e.g., freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior).
To link study hours to study effort, we assume that the relationship is log-log with measurement
error ζij :
ln(hij) = µ ln(s
∗
ij) + ζij (16)
Substituting in for s∗ij yields:
ln(hij) = µ (ln(µ1) + ln(ϕi) + ln(γj)− ln(ψi)) + ζij (17)
= κ0 + wiκ1 −Xiκ2 + µ ln(γj) + ζij (18)
where:
κ0 = µ(ln(ϕ0)− ψ0) (19)
κ1 = µ(ln(ϕ0 + ϕ1)− ln(ϕ0)− ψ1) (20)
κ2 = µψ2 (21)
The coefficient on ln(γj) then gives the curvature of the relationship between study effort and hours.
Recall that we had to normalize one γj for every department in the grade equation. Substituting
in with our estimate γ̂Nj and making the appropriate adjustments yields:
ln(hij) = κ̃0 + wiκ1 −Xiκ2 + κ3k(j) + µ ln(γ̂N ) + ζij (22)
where κ3k(j) = µ ln(Ck(j)/C1) and κ̃0 = κ0 + µ ln(C1). Here C1 is the normalized course for the
base department.
Since we can only link characteristics of the students to the evaluation data by year in school,
the observations we use in estimating the study parameters are at the class-year level. Let li indicate
the year in school of student i. Our estimating equation for students of level l is then:∑
i(li = l)dij ln(hij)∑
i(li = l)dij
= κ̃0 + wjlκ1 −Xjlψ2 + κ3k(j) + µ ln(γ̂N ) + ζjl (23)
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where wjl and Xjl are the averages of these characteristics for those of year level l enrolled in course
j. We correct for potential bias due to measurement error in γj using instrumental variables. We
use the share of freshmen, sophomores, and juniors in each class as instruments for log(γj), and
estimate using two stage least squares.
Estimates of (23) allow us to recover the elasticity of hours with respect to study effort, µ̂, as
well as an estimate of ψ2, how observed characteristics affect study costs, as ψ̂2 = κ̂2/µ̂. We can
also partially undo the normalization on the γs, solving for γs that are normalized with respect





provides an estimate of γj/C1. The last normalization–the returns on preparation and study time
in the normalized course–will be recovered in the estimation of the utility function parameters. The
remaining structural parameters embedded in (23) can be recovered after estimating the parameters
of the utility function, described in the next section.
4.2.3 Utility parameters
We now turn to estimation of the parameters of the utility function. Given our estimates of the
grade equation, equation (12), we can calculate expected grades in each of the courses given optimal
study choices:











Given the estimates of the unnormalized returns to study and ability, γ̂, we can express the utility
i receives from choosing course j and studying optimally as:
Uij = δ0j + wiδ1k(j) + Zijδ2k(j) +
(
̂E[gij |s∗ij ]− γj
)
(ϕ0 + wiϕ1) + ϵij (25)
We then substitute in for γj with C1γ̂
P
j which, after rearranging terms, yields:
Uij = δ0j + wiδ1k(j) + Zijδ2k(j) + ̂E[gij |s∗ij ](ϕ0 + wiϕ1)− C1γ̂
P
j (ϕ0 + wiϕ1) + ϵij (26)
The goal is then to recover the course fixed effects, δ0j , the value women place on courses in
particular departments, δ1k(j), other department-specific preferences as well as preferences over
instructor characteristics, δ2k(j), preferences over grades, ϕ, and the returns to ability and study
time in the normalized course, C1.
The variation in the data that identifies ϕ0 and ϕ1 comes from how individuals sort based on
their comparative advantage in grades. Someone who is strong in mathematics will be more likely
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to sort into classes where the returns to ability in mathematics is high. To the extent that women
are more or less likely to sort based on where their abilities are rewarded then identifies ϕ1.
More subtle is the identification on the returns to the normalized course. If separate course
fixed effects were estimated for both men and women then C1 would not be identified as it would
be subsumed into the course fixed effects. But by allowing females preferences to vary at the
department rather than the course level,20 the extent to which sorting happens beyond the effect
through grades themselves identifies C1.
We assume that ϵij is distributed Type 1 extreme value. If individuals were choosing one
course, estimation of the parameters in (26) would follow a multinomial logit. Students, however,
choose bundles of courses. Even though the structure of the model is such that there are no
complementarities for choosing particular combinations of courses, the probability of choosing a
particular bundle does not reduce to the probabilities of choosing each of the courses separately.
Simulated maximum likelihood
We use simulated maximum likelihood coupled with a fixed point algorithm to estimate the
choice parameters. To illustrate the approach, denote Ki as the set of courses chosen by i. Denote
Mi as the highest payoff associated with any of the non-chosen courses:
Mi = max
j /∈Ki




(ϕ0 + wiϕ1) + ϵij
Suppose Ki consisted of courses {1, 2, 3} and that the values for all the preference shocks, the ϵijs,
were known with the exception of those for {1, 2, 3}. The probability of choosing {1, 2, 3} could
then be expressed as:
Pr(di = {1, 2, 3}) = Pr(U i1 > Mi, U i2 > Mi, U i3 > Mi)
= Pr(U i1 > Mi)Pr(U i2 > Mi)Pr(U i3 > Mi)
= (1−G(Mi − U i1))(1−G(Mi − U i2))(1−G(Mi − U i3))
where G(·) is the extreme value cdf and U ij is the flow payoff for j net of ϵij .
Since the ϵijs for the non-chosen courses are not observed, we integrate them out of the likelihood
function and approximate the integral by simulating their values from the Type I extreme value
distribution. Denoting Mir as the value of Mi at the rth draw of the non-chosen ϵijs and R as the
20Note that females are also allowed to value having a female professor more or less than males.
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1−G(Mir − U ij)
)dij /R
 (27)
Within the simulated maximum likelihood procedure, we solve for the course-specific effects,
the female cross department effects, and preferences for upper division STEM and non-STEM
courses by for upperclassmen using a fixed algorithm in the spirit of Berry et al. (1995). Using
the fixed point algorithm serves two purposes. First, the number of parameters the optimization
routine searches over is substantially smaller, searching over four parameters rather than 1090
parameters.21 Second, it ensures that the model matches the data on the following dimensions (i)
enrollment in each course, (ii) the share of courses taken by each gender in each department, and
(iii) the share of upper and lower division courses in STEM and non-STEM taken by upper and
lower classmen.
The fixed point algorithm works as follows. Denote the share of enrollments in course j in
the data as sdj . Denote the share of enrollments of women in department k as s
d
kw and share of
enrollments for upper-class students in upperclass courses of type c, c ∈ {STEM,non − STEM}
as sdcu. Given an initial guess of the δ’s, we can calculate the model analogs to each of these shares
and update the model analogs in such a way that we eventually iterate to a fixed point. Letting












































Updating continues until the maximum of the absolute value of the change in the δ’s is sufficiently
small.
Recovering the remaining structural parameters
211071 course fixed effects, 13 female cross department effects, and 2 STEM cross upper and lower classmen effects
are solved for using the fixed point algorithm. The remaining parameters are preferences for grades for men and
women, female cross female professor, and the normalizing constant.
22If we were only updating one of these sets of δ’s no dampening would be needed. We have found that setting τ0
and τ1 to 1 and setting τ3 to 0.5 is sufficient for the problem to be a contraction mapping.
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Given ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1, and Ĉ1, we are now in a position to recover the remaining structural pa-
rameters. The normalizing constants for each department where k ̸= 1 can be recovered using
Ĉk = exp(κ̂2k(j)/µ̂2)Ĉ1. Estimates of the unnormalized γjs are given by γ̂j = γ̂
N
j Ĉk(j).
The remaining structural parameters from the study effort estimation, equation (23), are the
study cost intercept, ψ0, and the (relative) female study costs, ψ1. These can be recovered using:
ψ̂0 = ln(Ĉ1) + ln(ϕ̂0)−
ˆ̃κ0
µ̂
ψ̂1 = ln(ϕ̂0 + ϕ̂1)− ln(ϕ̂0)−
κ̂1
µ̂
The remaining structural parameters of the grade equation, equation (12), are the course intercepts,
βj , and the returns to observed abilities α1k(j) and α2k(j). These can be recovered using:









4.3 Estimation with Unobserved Heterogeneity
We now consider the case when one of the components of Xi is unknown to take into account
correlation across outcomes for the same individual. We assume that this missing component takes
on S values where πs is the unconditional probability of the sth value. Let Xis be the set of
covariates under the assumption that individual i is of type s. The components of the unobserved
heterogeneity are identified through the correlation of grades in each of the courses as well as the
probabilities of choosing different course combinations.
Integrating out over this missing component destroys the additive separability of the log likeli-
hood function suggesting that the estimation of the three sets of parameters (grades, course choices,
and study time) can no longer be estimated in stages. However, using the insights of Arcidiacono
& Jones (2003) and Arcidiacono & Miller (2011), it is possible to estimate some of the parameters
in a first stage.
In particular, note that the selection problem occurs because students select into courses. By
focusing just on the grade estimation as well as a reduced form of the choice problem, we can
greatly simplify estimation, recovering the grade parameters as well as the conditional probabilities
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of being each of the types. These conditional type probabilities can then be used as weights in the
estimation of the choice and study parameters.
First consider the parameters of the grade process and the course choices. With unobserved
heterogeneity, we now need to make an assumption on the distribution of ηij , the residual in the
grade equation. We assume the error is distributed N(0, ση). We then specify a flexible choice







πsLigs (θ, γ)Lics (φ)
)
(28)
where Ligs (θ, γ) and Lics (φ) are the grade and choice (of courses) likelihoods respectively condi-
tional on i being of type s.
We apply the EM algorithm to then estimate the grade parameters and course choice parameters
in stages. We iterate on the following steps until convergence, where the mth step follows:
1. Given the parameters of the grade equation and choice process at stepm−1, {θ(m−1), γ(m−1)}
and {φ} and the estimate of π(m−1), calculate the conditional probability of i being of type

































3. Using the q
(m)






is ln [Ligs (θ, γ)] (30)
4. Using the q
(m)








is ln [Lics (φ)] (31)
Once the algorithm has converged, we have consistent estimates of {θ, γ, φ} as well as the
conditional probabilities of being in each type. We can use the estimates of qis as weights to
form the average type probabilities of students of year in school l in class j to then estimate the
parameters in (23). Finally, we use the estimates of qis as weights in estimating the structural
choice parameters using (27).
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4.4 Implications from the Demand-Side Estimation
Even without estimating professor preferences, much can be learned from the demand-side esti-
mates. First, we can explain some of the persistent gender gap in STEM majors. Demand-side
estimates allow us to decompose differences in course choices, grades, and study effort between
males and females into parts due to:
(i) differences in preferences (δij),
(ii) differences in value of grades (ϕi),
(iii) differences in study costs (ψij).
The estimates of the model can also be used to see how enrollment in STEM courses by both men
and women would be affected by changes in grading practices. First, we can adjust the intercepts
in the grading equation such that the average student’s expected grade is the same across courses,
isolating the role of the level of the grade from the differences in the slopes, and therefore return




Table 4 presents the preference parameters with the exception of the study costs, the class-specific
intercepts, and the coefficients on year in school cross department cross level of the course. Recall
that the parameter on expected grades is identified from variation in how abilities are rewarded in
different classes. Both men and women value grades, with the estimates suggesting that women
value grades around 42 % more than men. The estimate of female preferences for female professors
is positive, with the estimate suggesting that women are indifferent between a class that had a
female professor and one that had a male professor who gives grades that are about 0.34 points
higher. This coefficient is likely biased upward due to the aggregation of departments. To the extent
that female professors are more likely to be in departments that females have a preference for and
there is variation within our aggregated groups, we may be picking up within-group preferences for
departments.
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The second set of rows of Table 4 shows female preferences (relative to male preferences) for
different departments. The omitted category is Agriculture. The largest difference in preferences is
between Engineering and Education & Health: 1.46 points, which translates into 2.9 grade points.
Engineering, however, is an outlier with all the other gaps at one point or smaller (≤ 1.6 grade
points).
Table 4: Estimates of Preference Parameters
Preference for: Coeff. Std. Error
Expected grades (ϕ) 0.2449 ( 0.0108 )
Female × expected grades 0.1029 ( 0.0106 )
Female × female professor 0.1723 ( 0.0110 )
C1 (normalizing constant) 0.1469 ( 0.0416 )
Female preferences for Departments
Engineering -1.1270 ( 0.0410 )
Econ., Fin., Acct. -0.4078 ( 0.0328 )
Social Sciences -0.2884 ( 0.0293 )
Chemistry & Physics -0.2347 ( 0.0334 )
Communication -0.1512 ( 0.0290 )
Mathematics -0.1307 ( 0.0360 )
Languages -0.1234 ( 0.0321 )
Mgmt. & Mkting. 0.1475 ( 0.0359 )
Regional Studies 0.1496 ( 0.0399 )
Biology 0.1818 ( 0.0356 )
Psychology 0.2391 ( 0.0367 )
English 0.3360 ( 0.0435 )
Education & Health 0.3374 ( 0.0308 )
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5.2 Study effort estimates
Estimates of the study effort parameters are presented in Table 5.23 Women have about 6 percent
higher studying costs compared to men. However, women also study more because they value
grades much more than men, with this effect at over 35 percent.24 On net, conditional on taking
the same class, women study approximately 30 percent more than men.
All of the measures of academic preparation (ACT scores and high school grades) are small in
magnitude. While African-Americans and first generation students have higher study costs, His-
panics and miscellaneous minorities have lower study costs. Those who are the second unobserved
type have higher study costs but, as we will see in subsequent tables, have higher academic ability.25
Finally, the effort elasticity is measured at 0.5256. If returns to ability and effort in a class increases
by 1 percent, students are expected to increase study effort by roughly 0.5 percent.
The second set of columns shows how the returns to study effort vary across classes, taking the
median γ class for each course grouping. The heterogeneity is quite large. An increase in study
time by 1 hour per week would translate into a 0.28 grade point increase in mathematics but would
only yield about a 0.05 grade point increase in Education & Health.
5.3 Grade estimates
The estimated αs, the department-specific ability weights, are given in Table 6. These are calculated
by taking the reduced-form θs, undoing the normalization on the γs, and subtracting off the part
of the reduced form that θs that reflect the study time (taken from ψ). The departments are
sorted such that those with the lowest female estimate are listed first. Note that in all STEM
departments, the female estimate is negative. In contrast, women have substantially higher ability
in Communication and Education & Health departments compared to males. This occurs because
females study substantially more than males yet receive only slightly higher grades in STEM courses.
Given that sorting into universities takes place on both cognitive and non-cognitive skills and that
23Because of measurement error in the γs that is compounded by it entering as a log in the study effort equation,
we drop classes in the bottom 5% of the γ distribution. Parameters of the study effort equation stabilize after this
point.
24This number comes from the difference in the log of the preferences for grades: ln(ϕ0+ϕ1)− ln(ϕ0) = ln(.3478)−
ln(.2449).
25The population probability of being the second unobserved type is 0.213. The information on grades and course-
taking does a good job of sorting individuals into types. See Appendix Figure X for a histogram of the conditional
type probabilities.
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Table 5: Estimates of Study Effort and Departmental Returns to Studying
Study Effort Median γ
Coeff. (−ψ) Std. Error Department Coeff.
Female 0.0617 ( 0.0838 ) Mathematics 0.8562
ACT read 0.0059 ( 0.0106 ) Engineering 0.7305
ACT math -0.0236 ( 0.0121 ) Chemistry & Physics 0.4551
HS GPA 0.0388 ( 0.0943 ) Biology 0.4511
Black 0.3947 ( 0.1802 ) English 0.4505
Hispanic -0.5260 ( 0.2955 ) Regional Studies 0.4180
Other Min. -0.0705 ( 0.3096 ) Psychology 0.3719
First Generation 0.0356 ( 0.1203 ) Econ., Fin., Acct. 0.3670
Unobs. Type 0.8449 ( 0.1068 ) Communication 0.3417
Effort elasticity Languages 0.3256
ln(γ) 0.5256 ( 0.1704 ) Social Sciences 0.2753
Mgmt. & Mkting. 0.1870
Agriculture 0.1757
Education & Health 0.1488
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women have a comparative advantage in non-cognitive skills, males at UK have higher STEM-
specific cognitive skills than their female counterpart even though in the population cognitive skills
are similar between men and women.
Negative estimates across all departments are also found for first-generation college students.
Our estimates of the study costs suggest that they also study less due to higher effort costs. It is
then not surprising that first-generation college students substantially under-perform, compared to
peers. See Ahn (2019).26
With the estimates of the grading equation, we can reported expected grades for an average
student. We do this for freshmen, separately by gender, both unconditionally and conditional on
taking courses in that department in the semester we study. Results are presented in Table 7.
Three patterns stand out. First, there is positive selection into STEM courses: generally those who
take STEM classes are expected to perform better than the average student. This is the not the
case for many departments. Indeed, the second pattern is that negative selection is more likely
to occur in departments with higher grades. Finally, women are disproportionately represented
in departments that give higher grades for the average student. Of the six departments that give
the highest grades for the average student (female or male), all have a larger fraction female than
the overall population. In contrast, of the five departments that give the lowest grades (STEM
and Economics), females are under-represented relative to the overall population in all but one
(Biology).
5.4 Drivers of the STEM gap
Given the estimates of the student’s choices over classes and effort and the estimates of the grading
process, we now turn to examining sources of the male-female gap in choice of STEM classes. Table
8 shows share of STEM classes taken for males and females as well as how that share changes for
women as we change different characteristics. The baseline share of STEM classes for men and
women is 0.398 and 0.284, respectively.27 The first counterfactual changes female preferences for
grades to be the same as male preferences for grades. This increases the share of STEM courses
for women by 0.72 percentage points, closing the gender gap by more than six percent.
26African-American and Hispanic students display diverging results. Hispanic students show lower study costs and
high ability weights. However, we caution against drawing too strong a conclusion here. African-Americans and
Hispanics onyl comprise roughly 7 percent and 3 percent of the student population, respectively.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Expected Freshmen GPA for Median Classes By Department, Unconditional and Condi-
tional on Taking Courses in that Department
EGPA Females EGPA Females EGPA Males EGPA Males Share
Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional Female
Education & Health 3.57 3.62 3.40 3.30 0.70
Agriculture 3.46 3.26 3.38 2.97 0.56
Communication 3.43 3.37 3.19 3.17 0.56
Mgmt. & Mkting. 3.34 3.41 3.20 3.28 0.52
Languages 3.28 3.29 3.12 3.12 0.55
Regional Studies 3.22 3.30 3.01 3.12 0.66
Social Sciences 3.12 3.10 2.97 2.90 0.51
English 3.07 3.13 2.91 2.99 0.65
Psychology 2.99 2.98 2.76 2.73 0.67
Engineering 2.86 3.02 2.79 3.04 0.18
Econ., Fin., Acct. 2.79 2.93 2.80 2.90 0.37
Mathematics 2.69 2.75 2.58 2.70 0.47
Biology 2.66 2.81 2.56 2.76 0.60
Chem & Physics 2.43 2.61 2.48 2.73 0.47
Overall 0.51
Turning off observed ability differences such as differences in ACT scores and high school grades
has smaller effects on the gap (counterfactual (3)), though larger effects are found for unexplained
gender differences in ability (counterfactual (2)). Note that these effects are not driven by women
being weaker academically per se, but in part due to women being relatively stronger in non-STEM
courses.
Counterfactuals (4) and (5) look at differences in tastes. Counterfactual (4) turns off non-grade
taste differences for departments, which increases the share of women to 0.31, closing the STEM gap
by more than 15 percent. These taste differences may be a mixture of pre-college experiences and
the culture of different departments. Hence anything the university can do to close the STEM gap
on this end is likely bounded above by this number. Counterfactual (5) turns off female preferences
for female professors. One way of closing the gender gap in STEM would be to hire more female
professors. However, even representation across fields would only close the gap by a little over three
27
Figure 1: Student Demand and Workload
percent.
Finally in counterfactual (6), we examine how changing expected grades across departments
affects the gender gap. Namely, we equalize mean grades across courses by increasing (or decreasing)
the course-specific intercepts. However, there is still heterogeneity in grades due to the relative
difference in γs and αs, the former being especially important as it dictates the returns to studying.
This counterfactual raises the share of STEM courses taken by females to about a third, higher
than any of the other counterfactuals. The reason the effects are larger here on the gender ratio
than in the first counterfactual is that the returns to studying are much higher in STEM courses
and women are willing to study more than men, due both to valuing grades more and having lower
study costs. Note that the effect of the STEM gap is mitigated because men also shift towards
STEM under this policy.
While the patterns here suggest a potentially inexpensive way of closing the gender gap is to
equalize average grades across fields, professors are likely to strategically respond to restrictions on
grading policies. However, the response may further reduce the gender gap. The reason is that,
if STEM courses are forced to give higher grades, they are likely to assign more work to deter
entry. More work translates into higher γs which make STEM courses relatively more attractive to
women. The reverse holds for departments that are forced to lower their grades: in order to attract
more students, they must lower workloads, implying lower values of γ which makes these courses
relatively less attractive to women.
With all of the demand-side estimated, we can show that student demand for courses have
prevalent correlation to workload (γ) and grade outcomes. Figure ?? demonstrates how innate
prefereces for courses and workload in those courses are related. The strong positive correlation
implies that in-demand courses usually have high workloads. The general trend is that lower-
division (introductory) as well as STEM courses have higher workloads and demand, compared
to upper-division and non-STEM counterparts. Part of this correlation may be fundamental to
the subject matter. STEM courses may translate to higher projected income, thus garnering
high interest from students. The reason that STEM courses translate to dollars may be, in part,
because the courses require higher academic ability and effort. On the other hand, courses in high
demand tend to be over-subscribed, and increasing workload may be an effective way of controlling












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Student Demand and Expected Average Grade
Figure ?? shows the relationship between average expected grade in a course and its innate
demand. In this case, there is a strong negative correlation. Again, one explanation for this
correlation is that STEM courses that lead to high-paying jobs are inherently difficult. Many
students who attempt to major in STEM have grade realizations that encourage them to switch to
a non-STEM track in the future, and this results in low expected grades in these courses, especially
at the lower-division. The causal argument in the opposite direction is that the stingy grades serve
to scare away entrants, especially students with low academic ability or high effort costs. With only
the demand-side estimated, it is difficult to gauge whether the dominant causal direction is one
way or the other. In the next section, we estimate the supply-side, which allows us to understand
the causal effect.
6 Equilibrium Grading Policies
In Section 5, we showed grading policy parameters βj and γj differ significantly across departments.
In particular, STEM courses generally have lower grading intercepts βj but higher returns on effort
γj compared to non-STEM courses. One principle goal of this paper is to analyze how these grading
differences influence course choices and the implications for the gender gap in STEM.
However, this finding also prompts an additional question: Why do grading policies vary across
courses? In particular, why do STEM courses have lower intercepts but higher returns on effort than
non-STEM courses? Understanding how professors choose grading policies is crucial to anticipate
equilibrium responses to changes in the environment. For example, increasing STEM preparation
in the hopes of increasing the number of STEM majors may be partially undone by how professors
change their grading policies in response to the new environment.
In this section, we develop a model which describes how professors choose grading policies and
propose a method for estimating the professor preference parameters of this model. The model
assumes professors care about three factors: (i) the number of students in their class, (ii) the cost
of assigning work, and (iii) grades given. Professors set policy parameters βj and γj to influence
these factors.
The model allows for grading policies to arise from differences in intrinsic demand of students.
Heterogeneity in non-grade preferences δij and abilities Aij imply that some courses would be more
popular than others even with homogenous grading policies. These differences in intrinsic demand
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imply that the relationship between grading policies and the composition and outcomes of enrolled
students differs across courses. A professor teaching an intrinsically popular course will need to
grade especially harshly to achieve the same class size as a less popular course with average grading
standards.
Because grading policies in all courses affect the choices of students, the composition of students
in each course depends on the grading policies of all professors. This general equilibrium feature
means that each professor’s optimal grading policy depends on the grading policies of all other
professors. We assume professors do not collude when choosing grading policies implying policies
are set in a non-cooperative game between professors.
To estimate professor preference parameters, we solve for parameter values which explain why
observed grading policies were optimal for professors. First, we estimate grading policy parameters
and student preference parameters using the methods described in Section 4. Second, we derive
the set of first order conditions which describe a pure-strategy equilibrium to the non-cooperative
grade policy setting game. This system of first order conditions describes how professor prefer-
ence parameters, grading policy parameters, and student parameters relate to one another when
all professors are setting grading policy parameters optimally. Finally, we solve for professor pref-
erence parameters which satisfy the set of first order conditions given estimates of grading policy
parameters and student preference parameters.
6.1 The Professor’s Problem
We assume professors choose grading policy parameters βj and γj to maximize an objective function
which depends on both the number and outcomes of students who take their class. This objective
function needs to reconcile the following patterns in the data:
• the correlation between βj and γj is extremely negative at -0.96,
• δ0j is negatively correlated with βj (-0.42) and positively correlated with γj (0.42), and
• STEM classes have even stronger negative (positive) correlations with βj (γj) at -0.61 (0.71).
To capture these features of the data, we set up the professor’s objective function to depend
on (i) the number of students in their class, (ii) grades given in the course, and (iii) the cost of
assigning work. In particular, we specify the professor’s objective function to penalize deviations
from the professor’s ideal log enrollment, ideal grade for the average student in the class, and ideal
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workload (as given by γ). Denote Gj(β, γ) as the expected average grade in class j given the
vector of grading policies for all courses β and γ. The dependence on β and γ comes through the
composition of the students that take the course. Denoting Pij(β, γ) as the probability i takes
course j given the vector of grading policies, Gj(β, γ) is given by:
Gj(β, γ) = βj + γj
[∑N




Then the objective function professor j maximizes is:












)2 − λ2 (γj − e2j)2 (32)
Specifying the objective function in this way allows for three sources of heterogeneity across
departments to affect grading policies. First is through innate demand for the courses. Courses
differ in their innate demand and systematic differences exist across departments. These innate
differences in demand affect both log enrollment–which affects the first term–but also affects the
probability particular students take particular classes which can then affect the average grade given
in the class. Second is through preferences for ideal grades. This is captured by e1j where ideal
grades may on average be different across courses of particular types. Third is through ideal optimal
amount of work to assign, e2j . The ideal amount of work to assign may differ across departments
in part due to differences in the grading technology: it may be easier to grade, for example, math
problems than essays.
6.2 Estimation
Denote Wj as a vector that includes indicators for whether the course is in each of the fourteen
departments28, whether the course is an upper division, and whether the course is upper division
and in STEM. We parameterize e1j and e2j such that they vary with Wj as well as unobserved
preference terms e∗1j and e
∗
2j according to:
e1j = WjΨ1 + e
∗
1j





2j are assumed to be orthogonal to the department and the level of the course as well as
innate demand (the δj ’s).
28Recall that classes are only counted as belonging to one department
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These unobserved preference terms are not, however, orthogonal to the grading policies. To
account for the endogeneity of the grading policies, we use simulated method of moments to estimate
the weights on grades and workload (λ1 and λ2) as well as the parameters governing ideal grades
and workloads (Ψ1 and Ψ2).
Because of the complexity of jointly solving for the optimal grading policies as functions of the
parameters, we instead set up a grid of possible grading combinations. These combinations include
the full range of γj ’s as well as βj ’s that produce expected grades on the support of the data. Fixing
the other professor’s grading policies as what we have estimated in the previous step (the estimates




2j , we then calculate the objective function
for the points on the grid. Note that this involves calculating the probability each student takes a
particular course at all possible grading policies for each professor, where when these probabilities
are calculated for a particular professor the grading policies of all the other professors are taken as
fixed.29
Given the optimal grading policies for particular draws of the unobserved preferences, we then
create moments that we can match from the data. The full list of moments are included in the
Appendix Table A.13. Examples of moments we match are, for each department, average grades,
estimated γ’s, and enrollment.
6.3 Professor preference estimates
Table 10 shows estimates of the professor parameters. The first row shows ideal log enrollment.
The number is close to zero–which is outside of the support–implying that enrollment is always
costly. Given that enrollment is costly, instructors deviate from their optimal grades and workloads;
giving lower grades and higher workloads than they would like.
The first column of Table 10 shows how ideal grades vary by department. STEM classes are
concentrated in the middle and bottom of the distribution while non-STEM courses are more
prevalent in the top of the distribution. This demonstrates that STEM instructors generally pre-
fer having lower average grades than their non-STEM counterparts. Note that for the baseline
category–agriculture–the ideal grade is between an A and a B (3.5). The actual average grade
29While for each draw of e∗1j and e
∗
2j there is one pair of β’s and γ’s on the grid that maximizes the objective
function, because we are searching on a grid the objective function is not smooth. We therefore do not just use the
points on the grid that maximize the objective function, but weight each of points on the grid based on how close
they are to maximizing the objective function.
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is closer to a B (3.1). This suggests instructors prefer to give high grades but do not so in part
because it would encourage student demand. The penultimate entry of the first column shows the
standard deviation of the unobserved preference over ideal grades. Most departments are within
one standard deviation of the unobserved preference with Engineering and Economics as outliers
on the low side and Education & Health on the high side.
The second column shows the results for the ideal workload. Departments with low ideal
grades tend to have high ideal workloads. For example, Engineering, Economics, and Mathematics
have the lowest ideal grades, yet are in the group of the four departments with the highest ideal
workloads. The correlation between the two sets of departmental coefficients is -0.94. The most
striking difference between STEM and non-STEM workload is in the transition from lower to
upper-division courses. While ideal workloads decline drastically for non-STEM (-0.369), they
barely budge for STEM courses (-0.018).
To summarize then, non-STEM professors generally want to give higher grades and require
lighter workloads. For upper-division classes, they offer yet easier classes. STEM professors in
general are stingier with grades, requiring higher workloads. While they offer higher grades in
upper-division classes, similar their non-STEM counterparts, the workload they require from stu-
dents never declines. Of course, the ideal grades and workloads professors wish to give may be in
conflict with student demand. When demand is too high, professors may be induced to decrease
grades and increase workload to control enrollment. Biology and Chemistry & Physics depart-
ments offer an eye-opening example of this dynamic. Professors in these departments prefer giving
students relatively high grades and low workloads. Indeed, their grading and effort preferences
track closer to professors in non-STEM departments. Yet, as we can observe in Table 7, these two
departments have the lowest average grades for freshmen, at around 2.7. The connection between
these seeming contradictory results lies in the high level of innate demand for courses in these two
departments. Average enrollment size in classes in these two departments are over 100, more than
double the size of the average class in other departments. This massive difference in enrollment
demand is not surprising, especially for lower division courses. In addition to high innate demand
to major in these departments, most freshmen will take at least one biology, chemistry, or physics
course as a core requirement. In addition, many other majors or tracks (such as engineering, nurs-
ing and other health sciences, and pre-med) require multiple courses in these two departments as
pre-requisites. The large number of enrolled students across the ability spectrum necessitates more
rigorous and stingier grading to control class size and provide clear signals to both students and
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professors about their ability to proceed on an ambitious academic career.
Table 10: Estimates of Professor Preferences
Ideal log enrollment 0.0003
Ideal grades Ideal γ
Constant 3.535 Constant 0.020
Engineering -0.369 Mathematics 0.501
Econ., Fin., Acct. -0.336 Engineering 0.421
Mathematics -0.248 English 0.261
Social Sciences -0.030 Econ., Fin., Acct. 0.237
Biology -0.004 Regional Studies 0.166
English -0.003 Communication 0.138
Chem & Physics -0.003 Psychology 0.137
Psychology 0.013 Languages 0.123
Mgmt. & Mkting. 0.057 Mgmt. & Mkting. 0.022
Languages 0.092 Biology 0.002
Regional Studies 0.206 Chem & Physics 0.000
Communication 0.215 Social Sciences -0.027
Education & Health 0.391 Education & Health -0.152
Upper division 0.343 Upper division -0.369
STEM upper division -0.002 STEM upper division 0.351
standard dev of ideal G pref 0.257 standard dev of ideal γ pref 0.415
weight on ideal G 1.724 weight on ideal γ 4.441
6.4 Supply-side counterfactuals
To better understand the role of professor preferences in grading policies and STEM enrollment by
gender, Table 9 revisits the counterfactual analyses of Table 8 in a general equilibrium framework
in which instructors are allowed to re-optimize their grading policies in response to changes in
student characteristics or other factors. To do this, we first take the first order conditions of
professor j’s maximization problem with respect to βj and γj . Following this, we rearrange these
first order conditions so that optimal grading policies of instructor j, βj and γj , are defined as a
function of student characteristics, professor and student preference parameters, and equilibrium
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grading policies of all instructors including instructor j. We then iteratively generate vectors of
grading policies until we obtain policies which satisfy the rearranged first order conditions. When
this condition holds, every instructor’s grading policies are a best response to all other instructor
grading policies.
The first seven columns of Table 9 conduct the same counterfactuals as the first seven columns in
Table 8; however, in Table 9, instructors are allowed to update their grading practices in response
to changes in student preferences and characteristics. A comparison of Tables 8 and 9 reveals
that incorporating supply side responses can have significant effects on predictions. In most cases,
allowing instructors to adjust grading policies leads to smaller estimates of effects on STEM and
non-STEM enrollment. This occurs because instructors often respond to an increase in demand
for their courses by choosing harsher grading policies partially mitigating the demand increase.
However, this is not always the case: The second columns of Tables 8 and 9 reveal that the effect
of eliminating gender differences in preferences for grades on Female STEM enrollment is 30.7%
larger when instructors are allowed to adjust their grading policies in response to the change.
In Section 5.4, we discussed results of a partial equilibirum counterfactual analysis which ex-
amines how requiring every course to have an average grade of 3.0 would affect the gender gap in
STEM. For this analysis, we updated grading intercepts βj to achieve an average grade of 3.0 but
held the slope parameters γj fixed. We found that this mandatory curve holding fixed the return
on effort would increase the share of women in STEM by 2.86 percentage points but increase the
share of men in STEM by only 1.75 percentage points, thus partially closing the gender gap in
STEM.
One concern with this partial equilibirum analysis is that it ignores potential instructor re-
sponses to this mandatory curve. If the curve forces an instructor to increase her average grades,
she may prefer to do this by increasing the return on effort γj rather than the intercept βj . This
is acceptable for students who are less averse to studying; however, it may not be attractive to
students who find studying especially costly. As such, curves that are achieved through changes in
γj could yield very different predictions than curves based on βj .
To investigate this, column eight of Table 9 considers a mandatory curve policy where instructors
can choose to achieve an average grade of 3.0 either by adjusting their intercepts βj or slopes γj .
Results suggest that although this allowance makes the mandatory curve policy slightly less effective
at increasing STEM enrollment, the difference is quite small. In the partial equilibrium setting
where only βj can be changed, curving increases the share of all students choosing STEM by 2.32
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percentage points; comparatively, in the general equilibrium when both βj and γj can be adjusted,
curving increases the STEM share by 2.24 percentage points. Moreover, the mitigating effects of
allowing γj adjustments are similar for men and women implying that the reduction in the gender
gap is nearly identical in the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium curving counterfactuals.
Once again, this suggests a mandatory curve policy may be potentially inexpensive way to increase
STEM enrollment and decrease the gender gap in STEM.
Finally, in our framework, grading policies vary for two reasons: first, because of differences
in intrinsic student demand; second, because of differences in professor preferences. If the same
instructor is assigned to teach both a course with low intrinsic demand and a course with high
intrinsic demand, she will grade more harshly in the course with high demand to reduce enrollment.
Similarly, if two courses have identical intrinsic demand but one is taught by an instructor with a
lower ideal γ, this instructor’s γ will be lower. Table 5 documented large differences in γ across
fields and Table 10 documented large differences in instructor preferences across fields. A natural
question then arises: How much of the differences in γ across fields is due to differences in instructor
preferences and how much is due to differences in student preferences?
To investigate this, column nine of Table 9 considers a counterfactual scenario in which all
instructors have the same preferences. At baseline, the average grade in a STEM course is 2.78 while
the average grade in a non-STEM course is 3.17. In a counterfactual setting where all instructors
have the same preferences, the STEM average is 2.79 and the non-STEM average is 2.87. In other
words, equating instructor preferences shrinks the STEM / non-STEM differences in average grades
from 0.39 grade points to 0.08 grade points. This suggests that most of the differences in grading
policies between STEM and non-STEM courses is due to differences in instructor preferences;
however, higher intrinsic demand for STEM courses does imply that grades would still be slightly
lower in STEM courses even if all instructors had the same preferences.
This finding has important implications for policy: Suppose a university wants to increase STEM
enrollment and is interested in reducing differences in grading policies between STEM and non-
STEM courses to achieve this increase. The university may consider a mandatory curve as discussed
previously; however, in certain circumstances, such a policy may be seen as overly intrusive. A
less intrusive, albeit more expensive, alternative would be to hire additional STEM instructors to
spread demand for STEM courses across more sections. This would decrease student demand for
any one STEM course which would lead to more lenient STEM grading policies and higher STEM
enrollment as desired. However, the counterfactual analysis in column nine indicates that even
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if enough courses were offered to equate intrinsic demand for individual STEM and non-STEM
courses, large differences in instructor preferences would imply that STEM grades would still be
lower than non-STEM grades. As such, hiring additional STEM instructors may not reduce grading
differences and increase STEM enrollment as much as one might hope.
7 Conclusion
The lack of graduates in STEM majors–particularly among under-represented groups–has been of
some policy concern. To address this shortage, we can import talent (via international students),
home-grow it (via cultural, perception, and didactic change at the elementary, middle, and high
school levels), and/or alter short-term paths of current talent (via inducing more STEM uptake of
current college students).
Importing and keeping talent may become more difficult as exporting countries become wealthier
and devote additional resources to STEM fields, calling more of the international students home.
Home-growing talent is desirable, but it remains somewhat unclear what policy prescriptions can
lead to the grassroots-level changes required to alter cultural attitudes and teaching methods to
emphasize STEM. If such a policy lever exists, it is expected to operate slowly, and may provide
results over the long run. In the short-run, then, ‘re-directing’ current college students toward
STEM may provide an immediate boost to the supply of technically savvy workers required in
industry and public sectors.
The current population of STEM students can be characterized as predominantly male and
white. Policy changes to induce yet more entry from this group will most likely yield muted results.
Minority students still comprise too small a portion of the student population to substantively
impact STEM population. More efforts should be concentrated on college matriculation in general
for this population. With similar academic ability and a much higher willingness to expend effort,
women, currently severely underrepresented in STEM courses, may be ‘low-hanging fruit’ that can
serve as an immediate injection of labor supply into technical fields. Increased presence of women
in STEM majors and occupations may also have feedback effects to change the cultural perception
and gender discrimination that may exist in the labor market to induce more girls to decide to
study STEM prior to entry to college.
We show that there is a potentially inexpensive and effective way to change the number and
composition of STEM majors. Namely, grading policies have a substantial effect on sorting into
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STEM classes. Students have an innate preference for certain fields of study, value high grades,
and evaluate the amount of effort/ability it would take to attain desired grades. In particular,
differences across these dimensions are pronounced across gender. We show that the gender STEM
gap can be substantially closed by having STEM classes give grades that are on average similar to
those in non-STEM classes.
These grading policies, however, are in part choices by professors. Hence administrative policies
designed to change how professors grade will elicit responses by professors on other dimensions
such as workload. These responses by professors may result in an even further closing of the STEM
gender gap. Namely, if classes across departments are forced to give similar grades on average,
then STEM (non-STEM) classes will employ alternative means to deter (encourage) enrollment in
their courses by changing workloads. This will result in STEM classes assigning even more work
and non-STEM classes assigning less work. Since women are willing to study more, the increased
STEM workload works as less of a deterrent to women taking STEM courses.
The interplay between student demand for courses and grading schemes has further policy
implications. Altering grading policies can lower (or raise) the bar for entry into certain fields of
study for certain student sub-groups, especially if there is heterogeneity in academic preparation,
effort costs, and innate preferences. The ease and low cost of implementation means that it can
have an immediate impact at the decentralized, grassroots level. A single college, department, or
professor can alter grading schemes to impact enrollment demand. No government-level mandate
is required and no additional funding (at least at the school-level) is required.
At the same time, this policy instrument is somewhat blunt, and care must be exercised in its
use. As we showed in the paper, raising average STEM grades induces increase in STEM course
enrollment. However, the gender gap does not substantially close, as both males and females
are enticed to take more STEM courses as a result of this change. Well-intentioned attempts to
increase diversity across socio-economic lines may unexpectedly lower the cost of entry further for
traditionally advantaged sub-groups of students as well.
Our research also points to a potentially problematic race to the bottom from interdepartmental
competition for resources. In an era of decreasing government support to public universities, many
schools are grappling with the prospect of shrinking or flat revenues from traditional sources. Many
schools are constrained in raising tuition rates by state legislatures, and even an unlimited ability
to raise prices will be tempered by declining demand. Schools have begun to emphasize revenue
generation from external sources (such as grants or new degree programs), containing costs, and
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reallocating existing resources to incentivize growth in enrollment through increased recruitment,
retention, and graduation of students. With respect to growing enrollments, departments may
have limited ability to attract new entrants to the school. Then, in essence, departments will
take the student body as exogenous and seek to capture as many students/credit hours as possible
from this fixed pool. An inexpensive method would be to increase ideal grades and decrease ideal
workloads, thus capturing more students from across the ability distribution at the expense of
other departments. Non-STEM departments that already have higher grades and lower workloads
will have limited ability to respond to aggressive moves from STEM departments. The end result
may be less rigorous curriculaa in both STEM and non-STEM courses, and over-subscription to
STEM courses from students who may not have the aptitude to be successful in STEM jobs after
graduation.
Ultimately, the research shows that, altering grading policies can be an effective method to
induce entry of more women into STEM courses, close the gender gap, and increase the overall
number of STEM majors. However, policy makers and instructors must realize that there can be
unanticipated responses from the targets of such interventions such that the end result may be
quite different from what was originally intended.
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Table A.12: Aggregation of Departments
Categories Departments
Agriculture Agricultural Biotechnology, Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Ed,
Agriculture General, Animal & Food Sciences, Biosystems & Agr En-
gineering, Environmental Studies, Forestry, Landscape Architecture,
Plant Pathology, Plant & Soil Sciences, Sustainable Agriculture
Regional Studies Appalachian Studies, Family Sciences, Gender & Women’s Studies, His-
panic Studies, Latin American Studies
Communication Arts Admin, Communication, Communication & Info Studies, Fine Arts
- Music, Fine Arts - Theatre Arts, Schl Of Journalism & Telecomm, Schl
of Art & Visual Studies, Schl of Interior Design
Ed & Health Allied Health Ed & Research, Comm Disorders, Community & Leader
Dev, Dept of Gerontology, Dietetics & Nutrition, Early Child, Spec Ed,
Rehab, Ed, Ed Curriculum & Instr, Ed Policy Studies & Eval, Ed, Schl
& Counsel Psych, Health Sci Ed, Kinesiology- Health Promotion, Lib &
Info Sci, Nursing, Public Health, STEM Ed, Social Work
Engineering Chemical & Materials Engineering, Civil Engineering, Computer Sci-
ence, Electrical & Computer Engineering, Engineering, Mechanical En-
gineering, Mining Engineering, Schl of Architecture




Chem & Physics Chemistry, Earth & Environmental Sciences, Physics & Astronomy
Psychology Psychology
Social Sciences Anthropology, Geography, History, Political Science, Schl of Human En-
vironmental Sciences, Sociology
Mgmt. & Mkting. Aerospace Studies, Department of Mgmt, Dept of Mkt & Supply Chain,
Merchand,Apparel & Textiles, Mil Sci & Leadership
Econ., Fin., Acct. Accountancy, Economics, Dept of Finance & Quantitative Methods
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Table A.13: Simulated and Actual Moments
Av. Enrollment Av. G Av. γ
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
Agriculture 32 30 3.44 3.43 0.883 0.881
Regional Studies 33 32 3.22 3.22 1.316 1.309
Communication 41 38 3.31 3.31 1.362 1.392
Education & Health 40 38 3.67 3.67 0.686 0.671
Engineering 43 43 3.08 3.07 2.823 3.018
Languages 38 35 3.19 3.19 1.256 1.250
English 32 32 3.03 3.03 1.779 1.758
Biology 142 134 2.84 2.83 1.671 1.725
Mathematics 77 75 2.78 2.75 3.147 3.132
Chem & Physics 114 110 2.76 2.71 1.439 1.414
Psychology 126 95 3.04 3.04 1.267 1.275
Social Sciences 52 46 3.03 3.02 0.999 0.990
Mgmt. & Mkting. 56 51 3.39 3.40 0.725 0.716
Econ., Fin., Acct. 79 69 2.85 2.86 1.350 1.328
Upper division 38 35 3.04 3.07
STEM upper division 37 39 3.30 3.38
Std dev lower non-stem 90 80 0.470 0.397 1.088 0.852
Std dev lower stem 30 32 0.419 0.427 1.106 0.788
Std dev upper non-stem 79 43 0.400 0.393 0.550 0.478
Std dev upper stem 42 36 0.451 0.394 0.525 0.469
Corr gpa with innate STEM enroll -0.454 -0.547
Corr gpa with innate non-STEM enroll -0.253 -0.410
Corr gamma with innate STEM enroll 0.293 0.207
Corr gamma with innate non-STEM enroll 0.214 0.383
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